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1. From International Migration to Transnational Social Spaces? 
 
For the viewers of the Turkish government channel "TRT Avraysa" on German cable TV it is 
obvious that some children of Turkish immigrants in Germany have embarked upon 
successful musical careers in both Turkey and Germany. For example, during the summer of 
1995, the German-based Turkish rap group "Cartel" (now disbanded) replaced Michael 
Jackson from being number 1 in the Turkish charts. Also, the nightly news on German TV 
usually feature reports on the widely known Kurdish political-military organization - the 
Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party). The PKK not only operates in 
Turkey but also tries to influence German politicians to exert pressure on its Turkish 
counterpart. Moreover, TV shows for Turkey are often produced in Germany and vice versa. 
For example, the state television engineers about a quarter of its shows for viewers of TRT 
Avrasya in Germany. The growing presence of Islamist groups is another example for ties 
that criss-cross nation-state borders. Not being allowed a formal status in the 1970s and 
1980s in Turkey, these organizations have grown and flourished in Germany. Also, it has 
been obvious that the remittances of Turkish migrants have been complemented by a flow of 
goods and information in the other direction. In addition, remittances are now being gradually 
replaced by capital flows such as direct investments of the children of Turkish migrants who 
invest in textile production in Turkey but market their products in Germany. Similar 
observations can be made for many other cases of sending-destination linkages and ties, 
such between the Caribbean islands and the United States (see, for example, Pessar 1997) 
or Morocco and France. 
 
All these examples point towards a circular flow of persons, goods, information and symbols 
that has been triggered by international labor migration and refugee flows. These exchanges 
include the circulation of ideas, symbols and material culture, not only the movement of 
people. The question is how such transnational phenomena can be described, categorized 
and explained. Are these phenomena limited to the first generation of migrants, or have the 
one-and-a-half, second and third generations developed their own forms of transnational 
linkages? What are the implications for the incorporation of international migrants and their 
descendants in the economic, political and cultural realms in the countries of settlement?  
 
The existence of transnational spaces carries important implications for the insertion of 
immigrants and refugees in the receiving nation-states. Up until now, two main strategies or 
ways of responding to the new environment in the process of settlement have been available 
to newcomers: adaptation and segregation. Transnational spaces enlarge the range of 
responses (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Responses of Immigrants and Refugees to Opportunities in the  
Receiving and Sending Countries) 
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We can differentiate the responses in distinct dimensions of insertion, ranging from economic 
over political to cultural. Although we can distinguish three broad strategies, the causal 
dynamics in each of these dimensions are somewhat different. The first strategy, adaptation 
in the receiving state has been conceptualized eloquently by the Chicago School of 
Sociology and their successors.1 Without necessarily adhering to the stage-conception of 
these models (e.g., cultural assimilation as a necessary step towards economic integration), 
we could take some of their main tenets to describe this pattern: In the socio-economic realm 
it means that immigrants and refugees adapt to the prevailing occupational, residential and 
behavioral patterns shown by the native population. In the political realm we would expect 
immigrants or, at the latest, their descendants to acquire the citizenship of the country of 
settlement and show loyalty, e.g., in case of war. Cultural assimilation, especially prevalent 
among the second generation, can then be seen to exemplify the tendency towards an 
                                                 
1 This model aptly applies to the U.S.-American situation in a specific period, because there was a 
long period of extremely low immigration (from World War I until the end of World War II), during 
which assimilationist tendencies could work. 
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eventual full acculturation in the receiving country -- not necessarily excluding a mutual 
exchange of norms, values and behavioral patterns between the migrant and native groups. 
Segregation constitutes a second main way of insertion. The formation of ethnic enclaves 
and ethnic niches corresponds to this strategy because it entails separate economies based 
on labor, capital and even consumers in distinct ethnic communities. A specific variant of this 
pattern are „middleman minorities“, consisting of groups specializing in trade and 
concentrating in the petite bourgeoisie -- with a high degree of hostility directed towards 
them; for example, Chinese migrants in 19th century America.2 In the political sphere the 
claim of political autonomy could even go as far as efforts to secede, as demanded by some 
African-American groups during the 1930s who strove to establish a black state in the U.S.-
American South. Cultural segregation essentially means that collective identities are 
transferred from the sending to the receiving country and that these identities develop in 
relative isolation from the receiving context. Extreme examples would include Hutterite 
settlers from Russia who settled in sparsely populated regions of the USA and Canada. In 
sum, the claim here is that these two main patterns of response have been complemented by 
a third one -- the border-crossing expansion of social space -- described above. While the 
causal factors and dynamics in the economic, political and cultural dimension of insertion 
may differ (see Figure 2, p. 12), all three main responses have corresponding patterns in 
each dimension. This discussion focuses on this third and relatively new response. 
 
Transnational social spaces develop in two stages. In a first phase they are a by-product of 
international migration and seem to be basically limited to the first generation of migrants. 
Researchers have long recognized that migration is not simply a transfer from one place to 
another with few social and material links. Rather, migration usually generates continual 
exchanges between geographically distant communities and migrants do not automatically 
sever their ties to the sending countries (Werbner 1990: 3). As a matter of fact, migration 
flows are characterized by migrant networks. First, only by the creation and reproduction of 
networks of migrants do migration flows turn into chain migration and thus become mass 
phenomena. Second, migrant networks, interacting with groups and institutions in the areas 
of destination and origin, form the raw material for the formation of new ethnic communities. 
Migrant communities in the receiving country can best be described from a structural 
perspective as a network of networks and organizations. In turn, international migrations are 
often also characterized by ongoing processes of return migration, where recurrent migrants 
regularly go home for varying periods each year, or migrants return to their communities of 
origin for good. After all, it has long been a truism that every migration stream breeds a 
counterstream. 
 
In a second phase -- the emphasis of this analysis -- transnational social spaces go beyond 
strictly migratory chains of the first generation of migrants and develop a life of their own. A 
qualitative leap occurs when transnational social spaces are characterized by self-feeding 
                                                 
2 In his essay on "The Stranger" Georg Simmel underlined the innovative economic capacity of 
those who have come today but will stay tomorrow (Simmel  1995: 764-71). It remains a question 
for further research why some of these groups have been economically so successful as 
"middleman minorities" (Bonacich 1979) who connect majority groups. For example, the position of 
Jews and other minorities as  pariah groups is certainly one important element (Weber 1980: 536-
7), along with the internal distribution of accumulated capital. Occupying a mediating function, 
these minorities can be seen as a sort of Simmelian tertius gaudens with nonredundant social ties 
in a sandwich constellation of groups. 
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processes or the dynamics of cumulative causation (see also Faist 1997a). This concept is 
similar to the notion of path-dependence that has been linked to stable equilibrium concepts 
in economics. Unlike this latter concept, cumulative causation focuses on the social context 
that (1) makes spiraling effects possible that may result in a vicious or virtuous circle: 
feedback cumulative causation and (2) denotes developments in which effects can turn into 
causes: A --> B --> C: cause-effect-cause cumulative causation. The first pattern (1) comes 
in two basic varieties: There are dynamics of cumulative causation that are positive feedback 
situations describing a sort of escalation (a) or feedback circles that end in going back to the 
state of origin (b).3 In his analysis of The American Dilemma in the 1940s, for example, 
Gunnar Myrdal proposed a model of dynamic causation. According to Myrdal, the reason for 
discrimination on the part of the whites was dependent on the response of African-Americans 
to initial discrimination: White discrimination and black responses mutually caused each 
other, they formed a positive feedback loop: As white discrimination intensified, so did black 
exclusion and anomic social behavior such als criminal acts increase. (Myrdal 1972, Vol. 1: 
75-8 and Vol. 2: 1065-70). The second pattern (2), cause-effect-cause cumulative causation, 
is a process in which effects turn into causes at a later stage in the development of a 
process. An example for cause-effect-cause cumulative causation in the process of migrant 
selection is the following scenario: Pioneer migrants start moving to countries of destination 
(A). Then migrant networks evolve when movers remit money, visit home, exchange goods 
and participate in various reciprocal actions (B). These migrant networks, in turn, form the 
raw material of ethnic communities to emerge in the receiving countries upon settlement and 
transnational social spaces (C). 
 
A process of cumulative causation can have final effects quite out of proportion to the 
magnitude of the original push. In our case the original push was the onset of international 
South-North migration. One of the effects has been the transnationalization in the economic, 
political and cultural realms for migrants and immobiles in the sending and receiving regions. 
Some examples exemplify this trend among the socially, ethnically, religiously and politically 
diverse Turkish migrant population: 
 
− In the economic realm there has been a partial shift from the remittances of the first-
generation migrants working in Germany to ethnic businesses in Germany and further to 
direct investment in Turkey of second-generation Turkish entrepreneurs living in Germany 
(e.g., production facilities in Turkey while administration and distribution occur in and out 
of Germany). When Turkish ethnic businesses such as restaurants and travel agencies 
started to emerge in Germany during the 1970s, this sector rapidly expanded in the 
1980s. Yet in some fields Turkish entrepreneurs started to compete with German firms. 
This was one of the factors leading to investments of German-based Turkish 
entrepreneurs in Turkey. Transnational networks of entrepreneurs have begun to 
encompass both Turkey and Germany. These processes can best be described by 
processes of cause-effect-cause cumulative causation. 
 
 
− In the political realm Kurdish immigrants came to Germany in the course of guestworker 
recruitment of the 1960s and early 1970s. This wave has been followed by a smaller one 
                                                 
3 Of course, the best example for this latter form (negative feedback loops) is the thermostat. 
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of refugees who fled Turkey as a result of the armed conflict between the Turkish army 
and the guerilla forces of the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. The growing militance of the 
fighting in Turkey, the continuing flow of refugees and the establishment of both militant 
(supporting the PKK) and moderate Kurdish organizations outside Turkey have turned the 
German polity into an extra-territorial stage for domestic Turkish conflicts and the 
attempted establishment of a homeland for Kurds, "Kurdistan". Elements of a German-
European-Kurdish diaspora in exile have emerged. This example corresponds best to 
"positive" feedback cumulative causation. 
 
− In the cultural realm the religious practices of second- and third-generation Turkish 
immigrants cannot be simply interpreted as a continuation of first-generation experience. 
Faced by xenophobic violence, manifold social and political discrimination and sometimes 
non-recognition of religion by majority groups, a considerable share of young Turks have 
also turned to Islam. In turn, the emergence of Islamist groups in Germany has been 
interpreted by some German groups to mean that Turkish immigrants do not want to 
assimilate. Again, this has reinforced Islamist trends among young Turks. Some analysts 
have described this as "positive" feedback cumulative causation that could end in a 
vicious circle for young Turks in Germany. 
 
The development of transnational social spaces now offers a unique opportunity to look into 
the formation of groups that span at least two nation-states. Some classics have argued that 
propinquity -- among other factors, such as a shared common interest and a common 
language -- is conducive to the formation of groups. For example, English trade unions first 
organized along patterns such as location, for example cities. Later, trades replaced location 
as an organizing principle, for example, among carpenters and other crafts (Simmel 1955: 
128-130). However, international migrants living in transnational social spaces form 
networks, groups and "communities without propinquity" (Webber 1963). One of the 
questions is by what principles propinquity is supplemented. Perhaps physical location and 
geographical distance are not the only grid upon which political (collective) action, shared 
culture and economic cooperation can be mapped. 
 
First, this analysis outlines some causal macro-factors that may have opened up 
opportunities to build transnational spaces to a greater extent than before World War II. 
Second, the discussion tries to clarify basic concepts such as transnational social space and 
the main resources involved, such as social capital inherent in social and symbolic ties. It 
also presents some causal chains leading from migration and flight over transnational 
exchange and reciprocity to transnational circuits and transnational communities. A few 
forays into the empirical realm serve to sketch the lineaments of transnational social spaces, 
focusing on the German and somewhat neglecting the Turkish end: the emergence of ethnic 
Turkish businesses in Germany and transnational businesses spanning both countries; 
efforts of some Kurdish groups to establish a homeland called "Kurdistan"; and collective 
identity in the religious realm involving Islamist thought and organizations, but also secular 
forms of everyday culture.4 The article concludes with a discussion of factors that may limit 
the future growth of transnational social spaces. 
 
                                                 
4 Islamist here means the instrumentalization of religion as a political ideology (Köktendincilik or 
Islamcilik viz. Islamizim in Turkish and Fundamentalismus or Islamismus in German). 
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2. Towards a Definition and a Typology of Transnational Social Spaces 
 
The examples mentioned above attest to the ability of movers to creatively pattern their 
personal and collective experience. We need to develop concepts that can be applied not 
only in either the sending or the receiving regions but also refer to emerging transnational5 
linkages, such as those between Algeria-France, India-United Kingdom, Turkey-Germany 
and Mexico-Caribbean-USA (cf. Pries 1996). Transnational social spaces are combinations 
of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of 
organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct 
places. These spaces denote dynamic social processes, not static notions of ties and 
positions.6 Cultural, political and economic processes in transnational social spaces involve 
the accumulation, use and effects of various sorts of capital, their volume and convertibility: 
economic capital (e.g., financial capital), human capital (e.g., skills and know-how) and social 
capital (resources inherent in social and symbolic ties). The reality of transnational social 
spaces indicates, first, that migration and re-migration may not be definite, irrevocable and 
irreversible decisions; transnational lives in themselves may become a strategy of survival 
and betterment. Second, even those migrants and refugees who have settled for a 
considerable time outside the original sending country, may maintain strong transnational 
links. The transnational social spaces inhabited by (former) migrants and refugees and 
immobile residents in both countries thus supplement the international space of sovereign 
nation-states. Transnational social spaces are constituted by the various forms of resources 
or capital of spatially mobile and immobile persons, on the one hand, and the regulations 
imposed by nation-states and various other opportunities and constraints, on the other; for 
example, state-controlled immigration and refugee policies, and institutions in ethnic 
communities.  
 
Space here not only refers to physical features, but also to larger opportunity structures, the 
social life and the subjective images, values and meanings that the specific and limited place 
represents to migrants. Space is thus different from place in that it encompasses or spans 
various territorial locations.7 On a micro-level this has to be seen in conjunction with the use 
of time to form particular time-space strategies of potential migrants. The context of decision-
                                                 
5 There is a marked difference between the concepts of globalization and transnationalization: 
Transnationalization overlaps with globalization but typically has a more limited purview. Whereas 
global processes are largely decentered from specific nation-state territories and take place in a world 
context, transnational processes are anchored in and span two or more nation-states involving actors 
from the spheres of both state and civil society. For a review of the conventional literature on 
transnational linkages, see Meyers (1979: 311-27). Also, transnationalization differs from 
denationalization. The latter term denotes the fact that the stateless and many minorities (in post-WWI 
Europe) had no recourse to governments to represent and protect them (Arendt 1973: 269). 
6 Basch and her associates give a vivid picture of social ties in transnational social spaces. They define 
"'transnationalism' as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social 
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes 
transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, 
cultural, and political borders.... An essential element ... is the multiplicity of involvements that 
transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies. We are still groping for a language to describe 
these social locations." (Basch et al. 1994: 8) 
7 For a more detailed discussion relating to international migration, see Malmberg (1997). 
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making is constituted by the potential migrants themselves in interacting with significant 
others, for example within kinship groups. Larger structural factors such as economic and 
political opportunities constitute a more remote, albeit an enabling and constraining context 
in which individuals, collectives and networks operate. 
 
Transnational social spaces are characterized by triadic relationships between groups and 
institutions in the host state, the sending state (sometimes viewed as an external homeland) 
and the minority group -- migrants and/or refugee groups, or ethnic minorities. It is useful to 
distinguish between transnational spaces formed and inhabited by migrants and refugees, 
and national minorities who have lived in a state since its foundation. Sometimes, the latter 
groups have stronger claims to cultural and political autonomy than the former minorities 
because of a longer history of discrimination and exclusion. For example, migrants and 
refugees with Turkish citizenship or ancestry in Germany can be distinguished from Turkish 
minorities in countries such as Bulgaria. Here, only the former case is of interest. 
 
One set of resources in transnational social spaces has to be explained in more detail: social 
capital embedded in social and symbolic ties. Social ties are a continuing series of inter-
personal transactions to which participants attach shared interests, obligations, expectations 
and norms. Symbolic ties are a continuing series of transactions, both face-to-face and 
indirect, to which participants attach shared meanings, memories, future expectations and 
symbols. Symbolic ties often go beyond face-to-face relations involving members of the 
same religious belief, language, ethnicity or nationality.  
 
Social capital are those resources inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow 
individuals to cooperate in networks and organizations. It also serves to connect individuals 
to networks and organizations through affiliations. We can differentiate the following forms of 
social capital:  
 
 
(1) reciprocity as a pattern of social exchange: mutual obligations and expectations of the 
actors, associated with specific social ties and based on exchanges and services 
rendered in the past (Coleman 1990: 306-9). These obligations and expectations can be 
an outcome of instrumental activity, for example, the tit-for-tat principle. 
(2) reciprocity as a social norm: what one party receives from the other requires some return 
(Gouldner 1960; Putnam 1993: 171-76). 
(3) solidarity with others in a group who share similar positions (cf. Portes 1995: 16). It is an 
expressive form of social interaction. The most important form of solidarity is "collective 
representations" (Durkheim 1898). These are shared ideas, beliefs, evaluations and 
symbols. Collective representations can be expressed in some sort of collective identity 
('we-feeling' or 'we-consciousness') and refers to a social unit of action. Cultural 
communities are the ideal-typical form such as families, ethnic groups, national groups, 
religious parishes, congregations, communities and nations. Solidarity can also be 
institutionalized: Citizenship, for example, is an institutionalized form of solidarity (and 
thus social capital) that is in short supply among those immigrants barred from 
naturalization. 
 
There are two main benefits to be derived from social capital: In general, it helps members of 
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networks or groups to get access to more financial (economic), human and social capital. 
This crucially depends on the number of persons in a network or collective which are 
prepared or obliged to help you when called upon to do, i.e., on the number of social and 
symbolic ties (Bourdieu 1983: 190-95). 
 
(1) Increasing information is the first specific benefit of social capital. Holding other factors 
constant, the information benefits of a large, diverse network are higher than the information 
benefits of a small, homogeneous network. In short, bigger is better; but size is a mixed 
blessing. More ties can mean more exposure to valuable information, more likely early 
exposure, and more referrals. But increasing network size without considering diversity can 
cripple a network in significant ways. What matters is the number of nonredundant contacts. 
Contacts are redundant to the extent that they lead to the same people, and so provide the 
same information benefits. People who know each other tend to know about the same things 
at about the same time. Therefore, the more redundant contacts one has and the more 
contacts reached through these primary contacts, the higher the potential to get 
nonredundant and thus new information. However, nonredundant ties do not always matter, 
there is at least one important exception. In leisure and kinship clusters it makes more sense 
to optimize for saturation than for efficiency. They constitute a congenial environment with 
redundant contacts. Efficiency mixes poorly with friendship and affective ties. 
 
(2) The higher the stock of social capital, the more control can be exerted, monitoring and 
sanctioning other actors. The basic idea is that the extent matters to which any particular 
person is an important link in the indirect social ties to others in controlling the flow of 
information, authority, power, and other resources. This means that some positions in a 
network or a group mediate the flow of resources by virtue of their patterns of ties to other 
points. The subsequent centralization of links means that ties and resources are 
concentrated in a few individuals rather than being spread more evenly across the whole 
group. Centralization is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for exercizing authority. 
Authority relations as a form of social capital exemplify this importance. For example, if a 
kinship group strives towards collective goals such as economic security, authority is one 
mean to solve to so-called "free-rider" problem (Olson 1965). Freeriding is an obstacle to 
sharing the costs of governance and is a component of transaction costs, i.e. the cost of 
policing the agreement on governance within the kinship group. The head of a household 
may decide who migrates and for what purposes the remittances are used. Authority 
relations may also be important in enforcing the norm that individual interests must 
sometimes take a backseat vis-à-vis the norms of the collective. This can be done by 
sanctions, by the internalization of norms and by a solidary structure. 
 
Social capital has two important characteristics: First, it is very hard to transfer from one 
country to another, it is primarily a local asset. Thus, in addition to political regulations of 
international migration, it is one of the main causes for the relatively low albeit increasing 
rates of international mobility. However, if transnational networks and chain migration 
emerge in the course of migration, the transferability of social capital and other forms of 
capital increases. Second, social capital is a crucial mechanism for applying other forms of 
capital, it is a transmission belt that bridges collectives and networks in distinct and separate 
nation-states. In short, social capital is necessary to mobilize other forms of capital, 
especially among those short of financial (economic) capital. And often, immigrants need 
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social ties to established immigrants or brokers to find work, i.e., to employ their human 
capital such as vocational skills and educational degrees in the receiving country. Social 
capital is also a sort of castor oil to establish a flourishing cultural life in the receiving country. 
Thus, social capital is crucial in the formation of a circular flow of goods and persons 
between countries and fulfills a bridging function. It is only when persons in distinct places 
are connected via social and symbolic ties enabling the transfer of various forms of capital, 
that transnational social spaces emerge.  
 
 
3. Factors Contributing to the Formation of Transnational Social Spaces 
 
What needs to be explained is the formation of transnational social spaces, ranging from 
rather short-lived exchange relationships to long-lived transnational communities (see Figure 
2). One macro-structural trend may have accelerated the emergence of transnational social 
spaces. The technological breakthrough in long-distance communication and travel occurred 
in the 19th century, new and improved methods of communication and travel, combined with 
increased levels of labor migrants and refugee flows after World War Two set the necessary 
but not sufficient stage for the development of transnational ties. The communication and 
transport revolution that started in the 19th century with transoceanic steamship passages 
and telegraph communication considerably decreased costs for bridging long geographical 
distances. This trend sharply accelerated after World War Two. Trans-European commuting 
is now possible to a higher extent than during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., massive growth of 
airline flights). One may speculate that the full breakthrough of factors enabling long-distance 
communication and travel was significantly delayed by the two World Wars and the period in 
between that was characterized by isolationism, immigration restrictions to a level not known 
in the 19th century and today, and economic depression. In sum, a variety of structural and 
technological developments has liberated communities from the confines of territorially 
restricted neighborhoods. 
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Figure 2: Factors Contributing to the Formation of Transnational Social Spaces 
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We have to distinguish processes of transnationalization in the economic sphere, on the one 
hand, and in the political and cultural realm, on the other. Transnational spaces developing in 
the economic sphere need transnational circuits plus beneficial conditions to invest physical 
capital in the original sending country, e.g., lower production costs, may suffice. Although 
individual transnational entrepreneurs obviously benefit from social and symbolic ties 
between sending and receiving countries (for example, ties through friends and kinship 
systems), economic activities do not need to be strongly embedded in these systems over 
extended periods of time through social capital in the form of solidarity. Exchange- and 
reciprocity-based resources are sufficient. 
 
This situation is quite different from the formation of transnational communities built around 
political or religious projects. Here, the main catalysts are, first, strong ties of migrants and 
refugees to the sending country and strong ties of non-migrants to the receiving country over 
an extended period of time. Social ties and symbolic ties need to flourish, i.e., social 
connections, language, religion and cultural norms. Second, these ties and corresponding 
resources viz. capital are not only embedded in migration flows but in other linkages as well, 
such as trade and mass communication. Third, juridical and political regulations (domestic 
and international regimes) may allow to varying degrees for the movement of people and 
tolerate or repress political and religious activities of (former) migrants and refugees in either 
sending or receiving countries. In short, ceteris paribus, the stronger the manifold social and 
symbolic ties of migrants and refugees between the two or more areas, the more numerous 
linkages other than migration and the more favorable the conditions for public political and 
cultural activities, the more propitious the conditions for the emergence of transnational 
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spaces in the form of transnational communities. 
 
We now need to specify some of the ceteris paribus conditions in the sending and receiving 
nation-states. First, the factor most conducive to transnationalization of politics and culture in 
the sending countries has been contentious minority politics relating to ethnicity and religion, 
often associated with the building of nation-states. These sending country conflicts tend to be 
exported or imported, depending on the point of view, (in)to the receiving countries. 
Examples abound, ranging from Indian Sikhs in Great Britain, Canada and the United States 
to Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. In the receiving country, 
conflict import is more likely the more liberal or tolerant the political regime, thus allowing for 
the mobilization of transmigrant or transrefugee resources, the deployment of capital and, 
eventually, full-fledged organization. 
 
Second, in the receiving context a bloc to socio-economic integration and/or a denial of 
cultural assimilation or cultural recognition is most conducive to the transnationalization of 
political and cultural activities. The two difficulties may go hand in hand, or may proceed 
separately. For example, an immigrant group may be locked for some time into a subordinate 
socio-economic position through lack of opportunity. Also, some groups may be denied 
opportunities for cultural assimilation or recognition while they are well-integrated socio-
economically. This used to be true for Chinese in the white settler colonies, sometimes until 
the late 1960s. In other cases, partial socio-economic exclusion and a perception on the part 
of substantial groups among the newcomers that their cultural recognition is blocked, may go 
hand in hand, as the examples of some labor migrant groups in Western Europe suggest, 
e.g., Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, and Caribbeans in the United Kingdom.  It may 
also happen that the migrant or refugee groups exhibit inappropriate cultural commitments to 
the receiving society, and/or are not interested in cultural assimilation or coexistence -- 
although this frequently charged claim rests on exiguous empirical foundations. Historically, 
white settler colonies have shown conditions most unfavorable to the continued existence of 
strong versions of transnational spaces such as diasporas. Colonists generally imposed their 
systems upon the indigenous people (e.g., American Indians or Australian aborigines), and 
established economic, political and cultural hegemony. 
 
Third, there must be a continuous and bi-directional exchange of goods, information and 
persons between the two or more countries involved. Anyway, a necessary prerequisite for 
international migration to occur are prior exchanges in the economic (e.g., foreign 
investments), political (e.g., military cooperation or domination), or cultural (e.g., colonial 
education systems) dimensions. This is why activities in transnational social spaces do not 
create such transnational linkages but usually reinforce them. There need not to be a 
constant circulation of migrants as described for the Caribbean context (Pessar 1997). Yet, 
return migration is important because it transplants former migrants back into the sending 
context and thus sets a stage for transnational reciprocities and solidarities. 
 
We can differentiate the options adaptation, segregation and transnational social spaces 
along two dimensions, the degree of integration into structures of both the sending and the 
receiving states, and the length of time involved, the durability of transnational linkages. The 
first criteria involves the spatial extension and measures the extension of social space by 
looking to what extent ties cross various groups and nation-state boundaries, while the 
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second refers to the duration, to the temporal stability of transnational linkages (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Stylized Development of Adaptation, Segregation and Three Stages of  
Transnational Social Spaces 
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Adaptation, segregation and border-crossing expansion of social spaces are all responses 
that start from dispersion in the wake of violent conflicts and repression, or expansion of 
labor and trade. Transnational exchange and reciprocity (strong simultaneous 
embeddedness in both sending and receiving countries but rather short-lived social and 
symbolic ties) are typical for many first-generation labor migrants and refugees. 
Transnational exchange becomes very visible in the manifold "export-import" businesses 
established by immigrants in the receiving countries so as to satisfy typical needs of 
immigrants communities for mother tongue videos, food, clothing and other supplies. The 
establishment of enclave businesses and niche economies, homeland-oriented voluntary 
associations (e.g., soccer clubs of Mexican immigrants in Chicago or tea houses of Turkish 
immigrants in the Ruhr area), the transplant of homeland political organizations, and the 
emergence of religious congregations are regular features of these processes. Reciprocity 
can be seen, for example, in remitters sending back money to members of his or her kinship 
group in the country of origin; especially in those cases when (temporary) territorial exit is 
part of a strategy including economic survival or betterment among migrants and those who 
stay behind, i.e., migration as a sort of  informal risk insurance. In those cases the migrants 
remit money to those who run household affairs in the sending place. Often, seasonal, 
recurrent and eventual return migration are part of these strategies. Yet, even the return to 
the sending country may not be permanent, as many older migrants temporarily migrate 
again in the opposite direction in order to secure their medical needs in the countries in 
which they once worked and some of their children or other kin still live. 
 
Following this stage immigrants and refugees in the receiving countries could take four 
distinct paths, all including processes of cumulative causation. First, assimilation -- 
immigrants and refugees embedded in the receiving countries and short-lived transnational 
social and symbolic ties -- implies that immigrants in a receiving country eventually integrate 
and assimilate culturally (acculturation) into the host society within one to three generations. 
In some cases the immigrants and refugees gradually break off most ties to the original 
sending country. Nevertheless, symbolic ties may still exist and even a form of "symbolic 
ethnicity" (Gans 1979) could emerge that refer to ethnic collective identity without having a 
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strong organizational basis among those who consider themselves belonging to an ethnic 
group. The case of "white ethnics" in the United States, the descendants of European 
immigrants who arrived until the First World War, is a case in point.  
 
Second, segregation is a likely response of immigrants and refugees when the receiving 
society discriminates the newcomers economically, culturally and politically severly. The 
case of the descendants of slave labor in the Americas is an example; e.g., African-
Americans in the United States from 1865 until the mid-1960s. In this instance the social 
space of these groups is even more restricted than under assimilation because segregation 
prevents the frequent and beneficial exchange of goods, information, persons and ideas 
across the boundaries of ethnic groups. 
 
Third, ties of transnational exchange and reciprocity may also develop into transnational 
circuits (Rouse 1991) that are characterized by a constant circulation of goods, people, and 
information transversing the borders of sending and receiving states over a long period of 
time. In the context of international migration, for example, kinship ties stunningly cross 
national boundaries. For example, by the end of the 1980s, about half of all adult Mexicans 
were related to someone living in the United States. Transnational circuits seem to be most 
developed in such cases of circular international migration. They also typically develop in a 
context in which we find (often rather successful) socio-economic adaptation to the 
conditions in the receiving country, or sucessful re-integration in the sending country. 
Sometimes, we see the so-called "second-and-plus-generations" involved in business 
activities in the former sending country of their parents or grand-parents. The overseas 
Chinese family businesses in South-East Asia and Indians in East Central Africa are cases in 
point. What is crucial is that these entrepreneurs and their dependants are firmly rooted in 
either the former sending or the former receiving country and use it as a sort of base from 
which to carry out entrepreneurial activities in the other country. Economic, political or 
cultural entrepreneurs use "insider advantages" such as knowledge of the language, knowing 
friends and acquaintances in the other country to establish a foothold. For example, a 
second-generation Turkish textile manufacturer in Germany may use his or her contacts to 
establish production facilities in Turkey, taking advantage of cheaper-priced Turkish labor. 
The above-mentioned Turkish rap band "Cartel", based in Germany, stormed the Turkish hit 
charts and thus successfully widened its international market. And members of Islamist 
organizations in Turkey and Germany use the atmosphere of German-style liberalism to 
subsidize the manifold political and religious activities of the Islamist Refah party. At this 
stage there is a possibility that persons engaged in transnational circuits choose adaptation. 
It is not far fetched to assume that successful entrepreneuers in transnational circuits will use 
their benefits and credentials to adapt to the socio-economic position of comparable 
autochthonous entrepreneurs. Such a development could also increase the readiness to 
assimilate culturally. It is much less likely that a path leads from transnational circuits to 
segregation, because mostly economically successful persons occupy the former space. 
 
Forth, transnational communities8 characterize situations in which international movers and 
stayers are connected by dense and strong social and symbolic ties over time and across 
                                                 
8 Communities [that is, Gemeinschaft] "encompasses all forms of relationship which are characterized by 
a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity 
in time." (Nisbet 1966: 47) 
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space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries. In addition to social exchange 
and reciprocity, social capital as solidarity is necessary for the functioning of transnational 
communities. Such communities without propinquity, in which community and spatial 
proximity are de-coupled, do not necessarily require individual persons living in two worlds 
simultaneously or between cultures in a total "global village" of de-territorialized space. Living 
in two places simultaneously is true of only very few migrants, such as hypermobile Chinese 
businessmen in North America in the late 20th century. This is an effect of the growing 
interdependence of the U.S. economy with the Chinese Pacific economies of Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and China. For example, these Tai Ku Fe En ("astronauts") establish a 
business in (say) Singapore, yet locate their families in Los Angeles, New York or Toronto to 
maximize educational opportunities for their children or as a safe haven in the event of 
political instabilitiy. The astronauts are constantly moving between the two spaces (Cohen 
1997: 93). 
 
In most cases the existence of transnational communities means that social and symbolic 
ties criss-cross nation-state boundaries for a considerable amount of time between persons 
and groups who are firmly grounded. After all, social capital flowing through and sometimes 
inherent in social ties is above all a local asset although it may become mobile and is 
transplanted from one context to another via migrant and migration networks -- which 
constitute accumulated social capital. Social capital acts as a conduit or transmission belt to 
transnationalization because it is both firmly grounded in at least two local contexts and still 
has the capacity to link across borders. It helps to transfer economic, cultural and human 
capital.  
 
This is a new quality that comes into existence through international migration and refugee 
movements. International movement, however, constitutes a necessary but by no means a 
sufficient prerequisite for the emergence of transnational communities; only the continued 
interaction between sending and receiving networks and groups that encompasses ideas, 
goods and information can lead to such an outcome. Of course, this is not to say that 
communities in sending states were isolated from the world political economy prior to 
migration. In virtually all migrant-sending countries peasants and other rural inhabitants have 
been connected to a global system of production and exchange, and located within a 
national and international economic and political hierarchy for decades or even centuries 
(Wolf 1966). Rather, international migration respresents opportunities for an expansion of 
these manifold ties. As international migration becomes prevalent in a certain place, growing 
numbers of actors acquire ties that link them with sundry cultures, economies and nation-
states. Transnational communities may take the form of borderlands. They imply a situation 
of bi-locality where an emerging syncretic culture is temporarily separated by nation-state 
border controls, but linked by legal and illegal migration. Good examples for borderlands are 
the riverain areas of the Rio Grande linking Mexico and the United States, and the Oder-
Neisse linking Poland and Germany.  
 
Again, as in the case of transnational circuits, there are alternative paths back to adaptation 
and segregation. As in circuits, successful economic, political and cultural entrepreneurs in 
transnational communities may finally adapt to the receiving society. Looking at another end 
of the spectrum, it could well be that marginalized descendants of immigrants and refugees 
develop syncretist identities that end up to function in a culturally segregative way, a sort of 
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multiculturalist segregation of the socio-economically excluded. 
 
We have now come full circle to the opposite end of the spectrum from where we began: 
Transnational communities vanish when we see gradual cultural assimilation or 
acculturation, or a forced rupture of material, social and symbolic ties to the country of 
common origin. In the 19th and 20th centuries transnational communities formed by labor 
migrants and refugees have usually been of a transitory type, especially in the white settler 
colonies of the Americas, Australia and South Africa. The generations following the first 
advanced to middle class status or returned home. Whether this pattern repeats itself in 
international migrations that have started in the 1960s is too early to say. This scenario 
requires that "immigrant jobs" or slots for immigrant entrepreneurs are filled by successive 
groups in a sort of queue.9 What is certain, however, is that in order to flourish and survive 
transnational communities need to distance themselves both from the culture of origin and of 
settlement in order to choose appropriate strategies of moving "in between". What a 
sociologist of religion observed for diasporas is equally apt for transnational communities: 
"La survie de toute diaspora dépend en fait de sa capacité à s'assurer la conquête de deux 
types d'autonomie: a) savoir maintenir sa propre spécifité par rapport à la société d'accueil, 
b) prendre ses distances à l'encontre de la culture d'origine afin de pouvoir choisir librement 
ses stratégies d'intégration et ses propres critères d'identification et de socialisation." (Saint-
Blancat 1995: 10) Essentially, transnational communities differ from transnational circuits in 
that the former retain some degree of insularity from the two receiving societies while the 
latter are much more embedded in one or both contexts. 
 
 
Transnational communities are characterized by a continuous involvement in a triadic 
relationship between themselves, the host country and the original homeland.  They could 
evoke solidarities that may be inconsistent and sometimes even contradicting the allegiances 
demanded by the territorial nation-states involved (see also Sheffer 1986: 8). This is most 
often the case with diasporas. It is important to discuss the relationship between 
transnational communities and diasporas. Especially in cases of war between host and 
sending nation-states the charge of dual loyalty and disloyalty has come up. In diasporas, 
there is a vision and remembrance of a lost or an imagined homeland still to be established, 
often accompanied by a refusal of the receiving society to fully recognize the cultural 
distinctiveness of the immigrants. Diasporas frequently include a full cross-section of 
community members who are dispersed to many diverse regions of the world, and who yet 
retain a vision or myth of their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland (for a fuller list of 
characteristics, see Safran 1991). Diasporas typically span collectives and networks in more 
than two nation-states.10
                                                 
9 There is contradictory evidence on this point. For solid support of the queuing-thesis for the 70s 
and 80s in big American cities, see Waldinger (1987); for a more skeptical but much less 
substantiated view, see Gans (1992). 
10 However, diasporas can only be called transnational communities if the members do also develop 
some significant social and symbolic ties to the receiving country. If they do not, we can speak of 
exile. There are basically two forms of exile, political and economic. The political exilee is a person 
who yearns to return to his home country after persecution and flight. Some temporary labor 
migrants with a clear intention to return home can also be regarded as exilees. Exilee communities 
are single-mindedly drawn to the former homeland; albeit the intentions, especially among labor 
migrants may change. This goal is so overriding that no substantial ties to the new and supposedly 
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There are two traditions of diaspora that can be distinguished in order to look at more 
permanent transnational social spaces emerging out of international migration and refugee 
flows: the victim diaspora and the active colonizer or settler diaspora (Cohen 1997). It is the 
second that could serve as a point of departure for our purposes; albeit with some 
qualifications. The Jewish experience usually first comes to mind as a prototype for diaspora 
formation; and could be extended to include African-Americans, Armenians and Palestinians. 
This characterization of a victim diaspora focuses on the catastrophic origins; albeit with 
enriching and creative aspects even for the dispersed themselves. 
 
By contrast, the active colonizer or settler diaspora finds its prototype in the Greek 
colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean. It includes expansion through conquest 
and colonization -- and most important for our purposes -- international migration. Historical 
examples that come close to our purpose are the Lebanese, Indians, and Chinese who 
moved abroad to trade and establish commercial networks, beginning in the 19th century 
(e.g., Sowell 1996: chapter 5). In an age of increasing transnational exchange we could go 
beyond these well-established cases and add international migrants and refugees as new 
groups who would fit the bill. Examples include Caribbeans in the UK and the USA and Turks 
in Europe.11
 
However, while transnational communities are typically embedded in an ongoing structure of 
social ties between sending and receiving countries, diasporas do not necessarily need 
contemporary and concrete social ties. It is possible that the memory of a homeland 
manifests itself primarily in symbolic ties. This has been the case for the Jewish diaspora for 
centuries after the destruction of the Second Temple, and for Sikhs after Indian troops 
stormed the Golden Temple in 1984. The difference between diasporas and other 
transnational communities becomes clear when we compare the Jewish diaspora before the 
establishment of the state of Israel with global communities such as Chinese entrepreneurs 
and traders in many countries of Southeast Asia, Africa, and the two Americas. The vision of 
the Chinese was (at first) much less oriented towards the ancestral homeland, and lacked 
components of exile. 
 
 
4. Economic Transnationalization: Entrepreneurs Moving from the Ethnic 
Niche to Transnational Businesses? 
 
In the Turkish-German case we find a gradual transition from intra-household and intra-
familial transnational exchange and reciprocity to partial transnational circuits that include 
families, but also larger groups such as ethnic communities. Three periods of self-feeding 
processes of economic transnationalization can be distinguished: first, remittances of labor 
migrants from Germany to Turkey; second, the inception and growth of ethnic businesses in 
                                                                                                                                                        
temporary country of settlement develops. Therefore, exile is not a form of transnational 
community. 
11 Even the groups involved in merchant and trade diasporas such as the Indians and Chinese 
included substantial numbers of forced labor. Just think of the coolie trade in the 19th century. 
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Germany; and third, transnational production, distribution and sale. 
 
The first period from the early 1960s until the 1970s and 1980s was characterized mainly by 
labor migrant remitters who transferred money to Turkey, and returning migrants who 
invested into housing and consumer products. In the 1980s and 1990s, the share of 
remittances from Germany to Turkey as a percentage of foreign trade have decreased; 
probably due to family reunification; partly, remittances from the Gulf states compensated for 
this decline. Nonetheless, if migrants' participation in the tourist and housing industries and 
their investments in other sectors are taken together with family remittances, international 
migrants have become not only the single most important source of hard currency in 
Turkey.12
 
The second period has been characterized by higher scales of economic activities in 
Germany such as investments in housing and the growing importance of a thriving so-called 
ethnic economy in Germany (ethnic niche). The number of Turks self-employed in Germany 
tripled from 1983 until 1992, from about 10,000 to 35,000. In Germany about 8 percent of all 
immigrants are self-employed; with Turkish immigrants coming closer to the higher rates 
among Greeks and Italians.13 This overall rate of immigrant self-employment corresponds to 
the rate of self-employment among German citizens (Bericht der Beauftragten 1994: II.2.10). 
Typical activities of Turkish migrants have included grocery shops, craftspersons, travel 
agencies, and restaurants.  
 
About 65 percent of all these companies are family-owned that employ above all the owner 
and family members (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1989: 177-78). Thus, new labor for 
businesses, serving the ethnic niche and a small but growing German clientele, has often 
come from the respective kinship group in Turkey. Therefore, many Turkish companies in 
Germany use a sort of ethnic social capital that emphasizes kinship groups as a recruiting 
pool (Goldberg 1992). Kinship-migration and marriage migration have enabled Turkish 
entrepreneurs in Germany to tap this pool of cheap and docile labor since the recruitment 
stop in 1973. Kinship-based exchange, reciprocity and solidarity is often accompanied by a 
well-known noir side: excessive exploitation of new labor from Turkey. 
 
Yet, more recently, a transition has occurred from the second to a third period, from the 
ethnic niche to transnational coordination of business activities. Some Turkish entrepreneurs 
have entered fields in which they found themselves competing with German businesses, 
e.g., software development and textile production (ATIAD 1996). Especially in the latter 
sector production costs are much lower in Turkey than in Germany. This induced textile 
companies to move production to Turkey, while retaining their sales and distribution centers 
in Germany. A small group of Turkish immigrants based in Germany could exploit various 
forms of social capital such as insider advantages: They have used language skills (a form of 
human capital) and social ties to friends and acquaintances in Turkey in order to gain a 
foothold in a transnational market. In these cases social capital is of utmost importance 
                                                 
12 After Germany and other receiving countries had implemented the recruitment stop in 1973 new labor 
migrants from Turkey increasingly turned to work in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. 
13 Labor migrant groups started in the entrepreneurial sector from a somewhat disadvantageous position 
because their initial large-scale entrance into the manufacturing sector and low amounts of human 
capital slowed down the accumulation of the assets necessary to establish businesses. 
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because it helps to lower transaction costs; i.e., costs arising from enforcing formal contracts. 
Informal arrangements cover diverse areas such as credits, labor recruitment and dealings 
with German and Turkish authorities (own interviews; this corresponds to the findings of Light 
(1972) and the subsequent literature on ethnic niches, enclaves and businesses in North 
America and Europe). In some cases social capital even helps to circumvent costly 
contracts, for example, in dealing with Turkish authorities when establishing production 
facilities and paying taxes. 
 
One could argue that this latest stage of business cause-effect-cause cumulative causation 
is restricted to privileged entrepreneurs with relatively high amounts of financial capital; such 
as the textile entrepreneurs just mentioned. It certainly is important to emphasize that the 
majority of migrants has remained proletarians or -- a small but growing minority -- modest 
self-employed (e.g. shopkeepers), or being increasingly excluded from the labor market on 
the German side (Faist 1995: chapter 7). Yet small-scale export-import businesses and mid-
sized textile firms both benefit from the same set of innovations in communications and 
transport that underlie larger-scale industrial relocations (e.g., of textile production). Put more 
broadly, these economic grassroots initiatives do not arise in opposition to more general 
trends of transnational relocation of production and trade, but are partly driven by them. Petty 
transnational migrant entrepreneurs and mid-sized companies occupy specific niches in the 
international division of commerce and production. In doing so, some migrant laborers who 
become self-employed partly substitute social capital for financial capital.  
 
A case study helps to illustrate the processes of cause-effect-cause cumulative causation 
involving smaller economic actors riding on the crest of transnationalization.14 In the case of 
international migrants from a small Anatolian village, Alihan in the 1970s, there was frequent 
contact between and among those men from Alihan who lived and worked abroad. Those in 
foreign countries such as Sweden (and Germany) also maintained links to family members 
still living in Turkey. These ties extended to Turkish migrants from other regions and Turkish 
male clubs and associations. These wide networks of communication were used to transfer 
messages and information about situations in Europe and happenings in the home village. 
By contrast, the Yeniköy migrants from a village in the same region concentrated their social 
interaction and ties exclusively on their own group. There were few ties to men from other 
regions and villages, even in mens' clubs, leisure activities concentrated very much on men 
from the same kinship group. 
 
Social capital among Alihan men enabled them to be very ingenious in the economic realm. 
They could be seen to be much more heavily involved in import-export business than 
Yeniköy men. For them international migration was indeed a part of a household survival and 
improvement strategy. Virtually all those who returned to Turkey became self-employed and 
settled outside Alihan, mostly in Konya, the provincial capital -- in addition to building houses. 
Some of the returnees did not only invest in joint projects with other Alihan returnees but also 
with persons from other parts of Turkey. Alihan men often went into joint-ownership projects 
with Turks outside their own immediate group (a sort of  tertius gaudens), whereas the 
Yeniköy men made no attempts to make investments together with anyone outside their own 
group. Yeniköy migrants mostly returned to their village and tried to fit savings and 
                                                 
14 The following account is based on a cautious secondary analysis of Engelbrektsson's (1978) superb 
ethnographic study of migration from two very different Turkish villages to Sweden (and Germany). 
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investments into the local economic structure of the village. One of the reason for their higher 
rate of return to the sending village was that they usually faced better economic opportunities 
than their Alihan counterparts.  
 
The key to understand these differences among the communities are to be found in the 
ability to mobilize various sorts of social capital such as reciprocity and solidarity embedded 
in social and symbolic ties. The potential migrants in Alihan who followed the first pioneer 
migrants could resort to dense social ties that encompassed more than one kinship group, 
whereas those interested in migrating from Yeniköy could not, unless they were members of 
one kinship group from whom the first migrant left for Europe. Alihan represented a village 
with a strong social cohesion and relatively few economic differences. The "collective 
representation" of the village as a cohesive unit was pervasive. All villagers considered 
themselves descendants of the original settlers and most families showed marital 
connections to other families in the village. Marriages were mostly arranged within the village 
with few newcomers entering the resident kinship groups. Help was present in times of need. 
Reciprocity in the form of mutual obligations thus even extended beyond the kinship group; 
there was a non-kin reciprocity, embedded in a village-wide solidarity of a sense of common 
origin, shared history and multiple bonds of kinship (certainly not representative of all 
Anatolian villages). In other words, various benefits from social capital, in particular 
information, could be derived from reciprocity and village solidarity acted as a partial 
substitute for financial capital. Alihan migrants were able to rely on a high degree of social 
capital. By contrast, migrants from Yeniköy exclusively supported the members of their own 
kinship group. Other potential migrants could not rely on the valuable social capital flowing 
from this one kinship group. The village that had existed for about 100 years in the mid-
1960s was grouped into various communities (Turks from Anatolia, Turkish refugees from 
Bulgaria, Kurds) that had little contact to each other. It is thus not surprising that the one 
kinship group -- located in the poor Turkish community -- did not share its social capital 
resources concerning migration with other villagers. 
 
In sum, when migrants from both villages found themselves abroad, the Alihan community 
with higher amounts of social capital more successfully exploited the new opportunities of 
transnational social spaces offered to them than those migrants from Yeniköy who kept very 
close ties to their kinship group only. We conclude that the transnational ties in the Yeniköy 
case existed for roughly a generation only; transnational exchange and reciprocity in a single 
kinship group. Transnational economic activities in the Yeniköy case effectively stopped 
when the migrants returned from Europe to Turkey, whereas it continued longer in the Alihan 
case, namely transnational circuits, embedded in a socially and culturally cohesive 
community. 
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5. Political Transnationalization: Kurds between Adaptation and Exile? 
 
In the public realm transnational social and symbolic ties and linkages are particularly visible 
among migrants and refugees who mobilize and struggle for political change in their former 
or prospective homelands. The vision of a homeland (yet to be created) and return to it is a 
powerful and crucial ingredient of diaspora formation in the case of large-scale ethnic 
transnational communities. Many politically active Kurds are engaged in a simultaneous 
"group-making" and a "state-making" project. Although not concerned with the maintenance 
or restoration of a homeland, some Kurdish groups have its very creation as a goal; be it an 
autonomous nation-state or, more modestly, increased cultural and political autonomy of the 
regions inhabited mainly by Kurds in southeastern Turkey. Kurds as a relatively coherent 
ethnic or national group and their homeland "Kurdistan" clearly are ex post facto 
constructions (Behrendt 1993).15 It is certain that they form a sort of  stranded minority: A 
prior state never existed before they started to fight for national autonomy. Yet, the territory 
now claimed by nationalist Kurds was partitioned into several territories after World War One. 
Some Kurdish migrants and refugees from Turkey exemplify this tendency. They live in 
Germany and demand political and cultural autonomy in the Republic of Turkey. Various 
organizations, ranging from the dictatorially-led PKK involved in armed struggle with the 
Turkish army to groups using more peaceful means, such as KOMKAR (abbrev. for 
"Organization of the Associations from Kurdistan"16) and the Socialist Party of Kurdistan 
(PSK), direct their demands to both Turkish and German governments. At the same time, 
some organizations maintain intense cross-national ties to Kurdish organizations in various 
other European countries (e.g. Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium; cf. Nielsen 1992: 123) and, of 
course, to Turkey. Political transnationalization has to be analyzed primarily as a triadic 
relationship between the host states such as Germany (and other receiving countries), the 
sending state Turkey (and other sending countries) and the refugee or exiled minority. 
 
Numerically speaking, the Kurdish group constitutes the second-strongest ethnic immigrant 
group after the Turks in Germany. Most Kurds either arrived as guestworkers or asylum 
seekers. First, Kurds migrated to Germany as guestworkers in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (according to estimates of experts about 85 percent of all Turkish citizens of Kurdish 
descent in Germany). Second, some Kurdish refugees arrived after the military coups in 
1971 and 1980 as activists, victims or targets of the fighting between "security forces" and 
PKK in the 1990s (about 15 percent). Compared to labor migrants who are ethnically Turks, 
very little remigration has occurred among migrants and refugees who are Kurds. This 
suggests that ongoing military conflicts, resulting ecological devastation, poor economic 
prospects and continuing persecution of the civilian population from either the state "security 
forces" or the guerilla PKK trigger out-migration and flight but prevent sizeable return 
migration. 
 
Three periods mark the development of this particular transnational social space. In the first 
                                                 
15 This is typical for new challenger groups in diasporas; see the Sikhs’s intentions to form 
"Khalistan"). 
16 Komkar was founded in the early 1980s; consisting originally of eight local associations, it came to 
include 40 centers and committees all over the Federal Republic in the mid-1990s. 
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period guestworkers of the southeastern Turkish provinces arrived in Germany; in the 1960s 
and 1970s no significant political mobilization rallying around Kurdish questions occurred. In 
a second period, tension and violence escalated since the 1980s between Turkish "security 
forces" in southeastern Turkey on one side, and Kurdish armed groups, mainly the PKK, on 
the other. Since then more or less open warfare between the two sides with massive 
destruction of the environment led to high rates of out-migration and many refugees who 
mostly move towards the major cities in Western Turkey such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, 
but also big cities surrounding the southeastern provinces such as Adana. Only few of these 
refugees ever arrive in Germany -- many of those who do are activists. Martial law has been 
in use in many southeastern provinces.17 Beyond the guerilla warfare in the southeastern 
provinces -- many of which are inhabited by a Kurdish majority while others are heavily 
mixed along ethnic lines -- there exists also a repression of all kinds of democratic forces. 
Kurds are among both the challengers and victims.18 Ironically, the severe repressive 
measures the government took have alienated a growing proportion of the Kurdish 
population, causing the PKK gradually to gain widespread support in spite of its reputation for 
brutal violence. Certainly, the armed conflict did not help to shift allegiances (symbolic ties) to 
the Turkish government. 
 
In a third period both the PKK and the Turkish government moved this conflict abroad, to 
Germany in particular. The German government as a NATO ally and host to a large Turkish 
and Kurdish population became the target of demands from the PKK who threatened to use 
Germany as a theater for warfare.19 In turn, the Turkish government intervened and 
demanded to outlaw PKK; the German Ministry of the Interior finally followed other countries 
such as Sweden and did so in late 1993. Yet this conflict does not simply involve militant 
organizations such as the PKK. The Turkish side also asked the German government not to 
grant official status to other Kurdish organizations. In 1985, for example, the German federal 
government decided not to recognize Kurdish and Armenian organizations as ethnic groups 
(Volksgruppen) who can apply for government monies to undertake integration measures 
(e.g. social work and language instruction).  
 
Intensifying conflicts in Turkey and the neighboring countries that also involved the German 
government and public have certainly added to the very high rate of mobilization of Kurds. 
For example, out of an estimated 500,000 persons of Kurdish descent up to 100,000 
                                                 
17 While the activities by the PKK have not undermined the territorial integrity of the Turkish state, they 
have nevertheless been a formidable military threat. This stark claim has to be further qualified. Even 
the PKK has signalled that it is ready to compromise on the question of territorial independence. For 
example, PKK chief Abdullah Öcalan has stated that politically he may be satisfied with Kurdish 
autonomy in a reformed Turkish state with a federal instead of the current rigidly centralized political 
system. 
18 Much of this persecution is motivated by an authoritarian brand of central and dirigistic nationalism 
(Kemalism), directed at all democratic opposition forces and thus including politically active Kurds. 
Examples for this suppression are the prosecution of Kurdish journalists and Kurdish language media 
reporting on events in the southeastern provinces. Other events have concerned the incarceration of 
Kurdish deputies in the national grand assembly. These members belonged to the Kurdish political 
party HEP-Workers' Party of the People (founded in 1991; later reconstituted as DEP-Democracy Party 
and HADEP-Democracy Party of the People) in 1993 and 1994. There seem to have been linkages 
between PKK activists and members of these Kurdish parties -- a high density of social ties and 
information flows as forms of social capital (Cürükkaya 1997: 76). 
19 The PKK has used countries neighboring Turkey as major supply centers, such as Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon. 
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participated in a single mass rally in 1993 (Mönch 1994). Although this should not be taken 
as a sign of political support for a particular organization, this mobilization rate is indeed 
remarkable. One of the crucial results of mobilization on all sides involved has been an 
increasing transnationalization not only of major actors such as the PKK. Also, there is a 
close exchange of information and persons between migrated or exiled Kurds and those left 
behind in the southeastern provinces, or living in the Western parts of Turkey. The density of 
social ties is continuously increasing. Among some of the means used are newspapers, 
telephone, video and music cassettes. Yet social capital used in the process of mobilization 
and challenge to state authorities also has to be closely differentiated according to its effects. 
For example, the authoritarian leadership in the PKK is a form of negative social capital, and 
the enhanced capacity to monitor and control members a negative benefit derived from this 
resource. It helps to advance the cause of an authoritarian organization involved in a 
separatist or autonomous Kurdish project but sacrifices individual autonomy and many lives. 
 
In the face of immense conflict, we could hypothesize that among refugees who struggle with 
adaptation in their new environments the acceptance of radical organizations is higher than 
among those who stayed. This would mean that symbolic ties can be mobilized more 
efficiently among refugees. There is some indirect evidence for this thesis. In a survey in the 
mid-1990s respondents in two main centers of refugees within Turkey (Adana and Mersin), 
the acceptance of PKK is higher than in cities with higher rates of emigration (Diyarbak⎬r, 
Batman and Mardin). Moreover, a newspaper close to PKK, Özgür Ülke, is more widely read 
in the in-migration than in the out-migration cities (Ergil 1995: 26 and 16-7).20  
 
The domestic aspects of the conflict have spurred the efforts of Kurdish organizations in 
Germany advancing the interests of Kurdish immigrants. Among the demands of 
organizations such as Komkar are additional instruction of Kurdish school children in their 
mother tongue(s) in public schools21; radio and TV programs in Kurdish language; counseling 
centers for Kurds; recognition of Kurdish names at German registrar's offices and support for 
Kurdish self-help groups.22
 
Solidarity -- as a form of social capital -- extended by the Kurdish activists and their Kurdish 
and German supporters to activists in Turkey makes the feedback loop complete and has 
                                                 
20 The written survey included a sample of 1,267 respondents in three cities with high out-migration 
(Diyarbak⎬r, Batman and Mardin) and three cities with high in-migration (Adana, Mersin and 
Antalya. The latter cities were the most affected by domestic refugee flows within Turkey. 
21 Up until the mid-1990s, mother-tongue instruction in schools has only been offered in Turkish; with a 
few exceptions such as in Bremen and Hessen where it is taught in a variant of the Kurdish language 
or dialects. 
22 All these events did not only contribute to the mobilization of the Kurdish population in Germany but 
also sparked debates in the German public on whether to send back to Turkey those Kurdish asylum 
seekers whose claims were rejected by German authorities. For example, one position advocated by 
German authorities has been that there are alternatives to Germany as a safe heaven, e.g., the 
western provinces of Turkey in which no warfare has taken place. A further issue concerned the 
usefulness of selling or donating arms to the Turkish army in 1991-92, outlawing the PKK, and human 
rights in Turkey. A veritable train of delegations from all walks of life in Germany to Turkey followed, 
including members of parliament, government, unions and NGOs. In the end, Turkish-Kurdish trench 
lines have come to even characterize public controversies among German citizens (Hockert and Liebe-
Harkort 1996: 338-363). Thus the triadic relationship between host state, sending state and minority 
has to be further disassembled by distinguishing various groups in the host state Germany and 
different groups among politically active Kurds in both Germany and Turkey. 
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triggered a process of "positive" feedback cumulative causation: The armed conflict in Turkey 
has produced many refugees. The ensuing social and symbolic ties that span places in 
Germany, other EU states, Turkey and countries adjoining Turkey are the basis of support 
for PKK warriors and those sympathetic to this organization. In turn, this solidarity and the 
material resources flowing from it intensify the armed conflict in the southeastern provinces. 
One of the consequences is that the flow of displaced persons and international refugees is 
steadily replenished. Some of the refugees move to Germany and are mobilized by various 
Kurdish organizations, some of whom claim that life in Germany is a temporary exile to be 
followed by the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. 
 
We can certainly discern diaspora elements among the Kurdish population in Germany (e.g., 
seeking to establish a homeland or cultural autonomy) and efforts to adapt to the German 
environment in trying to advance socio-economic integration. But the variety of positions 
taken on all these issues is too wide and too diffuse to speak of coherent trends going either 
way. It is likely that activist refugees form the main basis of the groups building a diaspora. 
However, there are significant differences: Activists and supporters of the PKK and their 
German intellectual allies are trying to build a sort of "refugee warrior diaspora" akin to the 
Palestinian example. They insist on the exile aspect of the diaspora and are busy affirming 
an emerging Kurdish identity. Yet the shared cultural expressions are still few (aside from 
folkloristic phenomena such as the Newroz festival). By contrast, representatives of Komkar 
correspond much more to the active settler type community. They demand both more rights 
to cultural and political autonomy for Kurds in Turkey and the integration of Kurdish settlers in 
Germany on an ethnically self-conscious basis. In short, the development is somewhat 
contradictory and full of unresolved tensions. Elements to be found in transnational 
communities, especially those in non-PKK groups and organizations, compete with 
conceptions of Kurdish politics and collective identity that clearly are projects of exilees in the 
PKK transporting nationalist projects. 
 
This tension among Kurds in Germany can be tentatively seen in the self-descriptions of 
collective identity. Comparing two respresentative samples from the mid-1980s and early 
1990s, Brieden finds that the percentage of Kurds in Germany who feel "Turkish" went down 
significantly both among the first and second generation, from about 40 percent to close to 
zero (Brieden 1996: 41). This research also indicates that there is very little social contact 
between Kurds and Turks living in Germany. The frequency of contact primarily depends 
upon the attitude towards the "Kurdish question" (1996a: 49). There is an attenuating trend, 
however: The reethnicization is much stronger among the first than among the second 
generation of Turks and Kurds. Also, importantly, among both Kurds and Turks there is a 
significant percentage saying that they are neither Kurdish, Turkish or German but European, 
cosmopolitan or simply "human being".23 If we do not interpret this result as an expression of 
a purely instrumentalist attitude, it would flatly contradict the one-sided hypothesis that 
political transnationalization serves to carry particularistic projects. 
 
 
6. Cultural Transnationalization: Young Muslims Between Disintegration, 
                                                 
23 This is reminiscent of the "cosmopolitan stranger", an ideal type who would show no ethnic or racial 
identification, except when pressured to claim identity (Park 1950). 
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Syncretism, and Segmentation?  
To emphasize the transnational aspect in the development of collective identity24 is not the 
same as saying that labor migrants and refugees live "between" two cultures. Early attempts 
have sought to interpret the experience of one-and-a-half and second-generation Turkish 
immigrants as being uprooted from Turkish culture(s) and not having been inserted in 
German culture. Also, in the literature on refugees one finds the assumption that to become 
uprooted and removed from a nation-state community means automatically to lose one's 
identity, traditions and culture. Thus, there is not only a transformation but a loss of culture 
and identity (for a sophisticated version of this argument, see Stein 1981: 325). Here, the 
emphasis is not on how international (trans)migrants have lost culture and identity but on 
how they may have developed new practices and orientations in transnational social spaces, 
a trans-cultural mélange. In its most pronounced form -- transnational cultural spaces such 
as the community of Muslim believers (umma) -- this claim poses a challenge to the binary 
either-or logic. The following analysis looks at re-ethnicization of immigrants and syncretist 
identities as two examples of the development of transnational social spaces in the cultural 
realm. 
 
A first impression of the complicated set-up relating to collective identity can be seen from 
empirical evidence generated by ethnic and national self-description. In the survey 
mentioned above, Brieden finds that the percentage of Turks and Kurds who feel totally 
German is close to zero; even among the second generation (Brieden 1996: 43). The 
reasons given by the respondents can be grouped into two sets: First, a feeling of rejection 
by German culture and second, the experience of discrimination by native German citizens. 
Yet, the percentage of those who also feel German was already 29% among Turks and 12% 
among Kurds; an indication towards a sort of hybrid identity that includes both German, 
Turkish or Kurdish elements of collective identity. We can now phrase the question as to 
what kind of syncretism (nowadays often called hybridity) exists regarding collective identity 
more precisely. Is this the sort of transitory syncretism or hybridity observed by scholars 
among immigrants of European descent who arrived in the United States in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries (e.g., Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, etc.), finally leading to cultural 
assimilation in generations following the original migrants? Or, do these syncretist viz. hybrid 
identities indicate a more sustained and uneasy coexistence of various ethnic and national 
identities and cultural practices that are not brought together successfully in an integrative 
synthesis because cultural segregation develops that isolates these communities from both 
the sending and receiving contexts? Yet another alternative would be that syncretist 
collective identities develop that successfully occupy a cultural space in between sending 
and receiving states. 
 
 
Transnational social and symbolic ties and the development of collective identities in the 
realms of religion, nation and ethnicity can be interpreted as a process of "positive" feedback 
                                                 
24 Collective identity is here meant to denote two dimensions: first, a common core of shared beliefs, 
ideas, the memory of a common history, aspirations, the identification with certain projects and second, 
ascription by others concerning the collective character, certain dispositions, memories, etc. 
Mechanisms of cumulative causation help to understand why the formation of collective identity among 
(young) Turks in Germany has followed neither cultural assimilation nor an often assumed reorientation 
to Turkey. 
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cumulative causation in the cultural realm. Again, various periods of transnationalization can 
be distinguished. The first phase was characterized by Turkish labor migrants, sometimes 
joined by family members, who intended to spend a few years to earn enough money and 
return to Turkey. In this period cultural practices were mostly confined to the private sphere; 
for example, the perceived transitional nature of religious affairs found its expression in the 
fact that rooms in factories or apartments served as prayer halls. The sending country’s 
(state) control of these affairs was minimal. The Turkish government certainly did everything 
to increase the flow of remittances but did nothing to organize religious life. This completely 
changed in the second period when various aspects of Turkish cultures in Germany began to 
flourish more visibly in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, mosques were built; cultural 
organizations founded. In short, cultural affairs became visible and its internal differentiation 
along ethnic, religious and political lines increased. In a third period transmigrants have come 
to use more and more elements found in both sending and receiving societies to cope with 
discrimination they encounter in the receiving countries, to participate in events back in the 
sending countries, but also to take advantage of an increasingly "multicultural" environment 
and public policies in the receiving polities that recognize "cultural difference" and "ethnic 
diversity". The triadic nature of the relationship has come to the fore when both sending and 
receiving country governments have sought to control religious and cultural organizations. 
 
The emergence of a transnational social space and concomitant feedback loops in the 
cultural realm can be exemplified when looking at young Muslims. Some authors have 
interpreted the experience of many Turkish youth in Germany to be one of disintegration 
(Heitmeyer et al. 1997). The underlying hypothesis is that issues of collective identity 
surfaced because of problems concerning socio-economic and political integration. 
Nationalist and religious we-groups grow more important because universally valid 
mechanisms such as access to the labor market and the educational system have not 
provided the basis needed for the formation of a satisfactory individual identity. According to 
this view many young Turks suffer from the effects of modernization such as ever-increasing 
demands on educational credentials or higher than average rates of unemployment 
compared to German youth, xenophobic violence, and a denial of cultural recognition on the 
part of German majority society. These tendencies could contribute to the retreat of Turkish 
youth into ethnically organized we-groups that offer collective identity along nationalist and 
religious lines. Importantly, these youth are seen as "rootless" in both the German receiving 
and the Turkish sending society. Many descendants of Turkish migrants are Turks in 
Germany and Almanc⎬lar ("Deutschländer") in Turkey. In short, this view holds that the 
experience of disintegration and manifold fears are the fertile breeding ground for Islamist 
orientations among many Turkish youth because they are threatened to become a liminal 
people. And the stronger discrimination is felt and the higher the propensity that "traditional 
values" are passed on from parents to youth in Turkish migrant families, the greater the 
likelihood that these youth espouse positions such as support of Qur'an courses and 
schools, of Islamic superiority and of religiously legitimized readiness to use force as a 
means of politics (Heitmeyer et al. 1997: 44). 
 
Extending these thoughts in a more systematic manner, we could now go on to argue that 
the tendency among some descendants of Turkish immigrants to adhere to Islamist groups 
has been taken by certain German groups as a sign that these young men and women of 
Turkish descent are unwilling to assimilate, to fit in. This could be taken by populist and 
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xenophobic groups in Germany to mean that they are justified in their prejudices. The 
feedback loop would be complete when manifestations of racism loop back to engender new 
sources of apprehension and further inclinations to clannishness and endogamy. For 
example, a substantial number of one-and-a-half- and second-generation Turks in Germany 
marry imported partners from Turkey. This kind of behavior could be thought to breed further 
hostility and estrangement on both sides. 
 
While the idea of a feedback loop is plausible, this particular interpretation of Islamic youth 
as the victims of both xenophobia and rejection on the part of German society is flawed for at 
least three reasons. First, not only discrimination and exclusion have contributed to practices 
and orientations that extend beyond cultural assimilation to German majority society or the 
uncritical acceptance of Turkish secular, nationalist or Islamic orientations. We also have to 
consider German public policies and proposals meant to advance "multiculturalism". Second, 
the above account overestimates the effects of discrimination in the receiving country and 
underestimates the political instrumentalization of religious mobilization in the sending 
country as causes of underlying Islamist orientations.25 Third, the interpretation of Turkish 
migrants and their descendants as victims seriously underrates their creative potential to 
establish social spaces beyond cultural assimilation on the one hand and a wholesale 
transplantation of Turkish orientations to Germany on the other.  
 
First, the transnationalization in the cultural realm is readily advanced by discourses and 
even public policies favoring multiculturalist tendencies, a mix of demands and efforts to 
grant specific (group) rights to ethnic minorities, so that they may express their cultural 
distinctiveness, develop political organization and engage in economic betterment. The 
demands of the certainly not coherent multiculturalist agenda include voting rights for 
permanent residents who are not citizens; affirmative action programs that aim to increase 
the representation of visible minorities in major educational and economic institutions; 
revising work schedules so as to accomodate the religious holidays of immigrant groups; 
providing bilingual education programs for the children of immigrants, so that their earliest 
years of education are conducted partly in their mother-tongue, as a transitional phase to 
secondary and post-secondary education in German. In the 1980s and 1990s, these 
tendencies have been publicized above all by German academics and politicians. Also, 
Turkish interest groups who do not share any of the premises of the German organizations 
have taken up many of these demands and made them part of their own agenda. The 
demands of Islamist groups who demand recognition as a religious group on a basis similar 
to the main Christian denominations and Islamic organizations who establish primary schools 
and look for public subsidies are another. To the extent that multiculturalist policies agree 
with the agenda of Muslim organizations, we should expect efforts on their part to maintain, 
change and build socially cohesive collectives based on symbolic religious, ethnic and 
national ties. However, these processes are not signs of disintegration. Rather, they are 
                                                 
25 It is not possible here to discuss the problems pertaining to the conceptualization of collective action 
underlying the disintegration thesis. It should suffice to point out that this thesis rests on a simplistic 
understanding of Durkheim's Division of Labor (1964): The advancing differentiation of something 
called "society" (read: increasing division of labor, modernization, etc.) threatens the "shared 
consciousness" based on the essential similarity of individuals. Into the gap arising between the level of 
differentiation, on the one side, and the level of shared consciousness, on the other, moves anomie. 
For a devastating critique of the Durkheimian model of collective action and alternatives based on the 
resource mobilization theory, see Tilly (1978). 
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regular features of the integration of newcomers. 
 
Second, the activities of Islamist organizations in Germany are partly an outgrowth of an 
ever-increasing re-islamization of public life in Turkey. For these organizations Turkish 
migrants in Germany are primarily of political interest. These groups try to gain power in 
Turkish domestic politics. Since the 1950s Islam has become an extremely contested current 
in Turkey. For example, Islamist groups have tried to present Islam as the new bond for 
Turkish nationalism; thus challenging the legacy of Kemalist nationalism. The D⇑T⇑B 
(Diyanet ⇑⎭leri Türk ⇑slam Birli i), a branch of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet ⇑⎭leri Ba⎭kanl⎬ ⎬, D⇑B) has been active in Germany since 1985; but only after 
Islamist organizations such as the Assocation of the New World View in Europe 
(AMGT/Avrupa Milli Görü⎭ Teskilatlari; nowadays IGMG or Milli Görü⎭) and the Association 
of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ/Islam Kültür Merkezleri Birli i) had recruited members and 
built mosques (Faist 1996: 87-8). These developments in Germany cannot be understood 
without the new policies of the Turkish government towards Islam. It has accelerated 
mobilization around religion among the most numerous religious groups, the Sunnis and 
Alevis. Since the early 1990s the Turkish government has departed from the Kemalist 
tradition, at times actively fostering a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. For example, religious 
education, once an optional subject in primary and secondary schools, was made 
mandatory. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was strengthened, numerous new mosques 
built and imams appointed; not only in Sunni but also in Alevi communities. What once 
started out as a confused right-wing doctrine to address the spread of socialism during the 
1970s in Turkey -- combining fervent Turkish nationalism and Islamism -- has virtually come 
to be elevated to a quasi-official state policy. 
 
While the activities of Islamist organizations in Turkey and Germany may have strengthened 
Turkish nationalism and Muslim transnationalism, the messages of the organizations 
involved have contradictory implications. On the one hand, Islamist propaganda emphasizes 
in-group social and symbolic ties and thus segregation from German society (Gür 1993: 45-
9). On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the first generation is to stay in Germany 
and there is no question about the one-and-a-half, the second and third generations. While 
staying in Germany does not necessarily lead to increased contacts to Germans and vice 
versa, it replaces a one-sided orientation to Turkey with a bi- or transnational focus. For 
example, issues of education and employment are practical questions to be solved in 
Germany. And even nationalist and religious organizations wooing young Turks grown up in 
Germany deliver a double message: "Wir, wir, wir sind von hier, sind Einheimische" (We, we, 
we are from here, we are indigenous") and "Wir sind Türken, sind Muslime, sind zivilisiert" 
(We are Turks, we are Mulsims, we are civilized; cited in Karaka⎭o lu-Ayd⎬n 1997: 37). This 
double message is extended to young Turks in Germany by very different organizations, 
ranging from the now nationalist-cum-Islamist Grey Wolves and the Islamist Milli Görü⎭ to the 
religious organizations directed by the Turkish Directory of Religious Affairs with its German 
branch DITIB. In short, in an effort to control young Muslims in Germany through social and 
symbolic ties and capital, religious organizations inadvertently relinquish a one-sided sending 
country orientation. Symbolic ties of a more complex nature are bound to appear, with 
implications for group solidarities. 
 
Third, the victim angle emphasizing discrimination or disintegration and the 
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instrumentalization of young Turks by religious and nationalist organization could seriously 
underrate the creative and enriching potentials of young Turks living in Germany. For 
example, it neglects all those youth who understand themselves as practicing Muslims, yet 
not as Islamists. And in a representative survey among young Turks in Berlin (1993) one 
third reported to be "atheists". The concept of disintegration is flawed because it tends to 
emphasize the idea of uprootedness and transplantation. It is here that the term "translated 
people" may be apt to enrich existing images.26 The term suggests that the social context of 
adaptation for migrants in transnational social spaces has changed considerably over the 
past decades. Translated migrants are continually engaged in translating languages, culture, 
norms, and social and symbolic ties. Translated persons are situated in diverse contexts and 
occupy ambivalent positions. However, there is no simple return to the sending country. The 
individual and collective identities are not fixed once and for all; they are not permanent over 
decades or centuries. The translations keep going on; embedded in concrete social ties and 
newly-emerging symbolic ties. This last qualification clearly goes beyond the postmodernist 
tinge this term has in Rushdie’s writings. If we assume for just a moment that people don’t fly 
around on magic carpets but cross bridges and enter doors, the spatial embeddedness of 
locally-specific resources places a limit to the free-floating symbolic attachments. In short, we 
should not overemphasize the aspect of translation as opposed to real experiences of 
uprootedness for refugees and the problems of transplanting old elements and adapting to a 
new environment. Yet it would also be inadequate to underestimate the translating capacities 
of immigrants and their descendants. 
 
This energy becomes visible, for example, in the adaptation of musical styles. Hiphop and 
rap are exported to Turkey (see, for example, Zeitmagazin, 25.4. 1997: 16-19). A preliminary 
ethnographic analysis of some texts by Turkish youth suggests that empirical research would 
do well to extend its one-sided focus on discrimination, alienation and subsequent entry into 
religiously-Islamic and nationalist organizations. In one of the songs of the former Turkish rap 
group "Cartel" we find: "DU BIST TÜRKE ... in Deutschland ... verstehe das, vergiß' es nicht." 
(cited in Heitmeyer et al. 1997: 84)27 This is not (yet) double consciousness in the sense of 
W.E.B. DuBois (1989: 1-9); it is partly a self-conscious search for individual and collective 
identity, keeping a distance to both German and Turkish contexts. 
  
These expressions of identity are both transnational and youth-subcultural. Yet, unlike 
subcultures, which can be understood as persistent behaviors, values and norms of socially 
homogeneous groups who live in a single national or even a global society, Turkish 
                                                 
26 This term, borrowed from the novelist Salman Rushdie (1989), is different from "uprooted" (cf. 
Handlin 1955) and "transplanted" (cf. Bodnar 1985). The term "translated" is not meant to criticize 
Handlin's and Bodnar's analyses. Their work dealt with European migrants in the United States around 
the turn of the century. Migration and integration occurred under very different circumstances from 
today. -- The term "uprooted“ has much similarity with Robert E. Park's "marginal man" (Park 1950). 
This term, borrowed from the novelist Salman Rushdie (1989), is different from "uprooted" (cf. 
Handlin 1955) and "transplanted" (cf. Bodnar 1985). 
27 "YOU ARE A TURK ... in Germany ... Understand it, don't forget it." One young Turkish man put it 
succintly: "Ich bin, der ich bin. Diese scheiße mit den zwei kulturen steht mir bis hier, was soll das, was 
bringt mir'n kluger schnack mit zwei fellen, auf denen mein arsch kein platz hat, 'n fell streck ich mir 
über'n leib, damit mir nich bange wird, aber unter'n arsch brauch ich verdammich bloß festen boden, 
wo ich kauer und ende. Die wollen mir weismachen, daß ich wie ne vertrackte rumheul an muttern ihr 
zipfel und, auch wenn's hell is, bibber vor angst, weil mich das mit innen und außen plagt." (Zaimoglu 
1995: 96) 
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transmigrants are a heterogeneous group. They often have lived for extended periods of time 
in two countries and have incorporated both German and Turkish cultural influences. At 
times, they activate elements of both selectively. Migrants' transnationalization grows hand-
in-hand with their insularity from both German and Turkish society. This, in turn, is one of the 
main characteristics of diaspora formation. 
 
What the discussion of transnationalization of politics already indicated, comes to the fore 
when looking at collective identity related to religion and nation: Underlying this extension is 
a recognition that transnational social spaces are not only constituted by concrete social ties 
but also by symbolic ties involving acts of imagination. In the age of instant 
telecommunication (not to forget instant social science and theology!) and good value for 
money long-distance travel, religious communities such as the umma can be created and 
integrated in a new image through the mind and through shared imagination. Yet these 
communities are not simply transnational. They have local roots, sometimes in two or more 
countries, while symbolic ties act as bridges between different nation-state contexts. 
 
The umma is a particularly interesting case of imagined transnational space because the 
claim extends to a truly transnational Muslim community of believers transcending nation-
state borders and the domestic politics of the countries covered. While there is certainly no 
one umma (Roy 1996), many Turkish(-German) organizations maintain close formal links to 
counterparts not only in Turkey but also in other European countries. For example, IGMG 
has close links to the Turkish Refah Partisi. Even more transnational is the Association of 
Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) since it constitutes the German branch of a worldwide 
enterprise with representations in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, 
USA, Argentinia and Brasil (for more examples, see Feindt-Riggers and Steinbach 1997: 44-
6). While Muslim organizations are not structured in the same way as the Catholic church 
worldwide, transnational ties foster networks that go beyond bilateral linkages. 
 
In sum, the "positive" feedback processes involving cumulative causation concerning a 
declining legitimacy of cultural assimilation as a shared vision, the extension of multicultural 
rights, the political mobilization around cultural discrimination and socio-economic exclusion 
and the translation of cultural and political conflicts from Turkey to Germany and back have 
contributed to an increasing transnationalization. 
 
Instead of stretching the term diaspora beyond its limits, I propose to speak of a 
transnationalized and segmented cultural space characterized by syncretist identities, 
populated by sundry ethnic, political, religious and subcultural groups: Transnational means 
that cultural elements from both the original sending and receiving countries have found 
entry in the cultural repertoire of the descendants of migrants. In addition, it is sometimes 
part of an international or global culture, as in the youth subculture. Collective 
representations can be thought to be syncretist to emphasize the active role of the 
immigrants themselves. The main opposition between sending and receiving areas is 
attenuated by the fact that transnational collective identity means that there is a cultural 
distance towards both mainstream Turkish and German cultures. This is sometimes seen as 
the hallmark of diasporic cultures. However, I think it is a characteristic of most transnational 
social and cultural spaces. The major resources to bridge networks and groups across 
borders are local assets such as various forms of social capital. This enables transmigrants 
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not only to "think transnationally and act locally" but also to "think locally and act 
transnationally" and to "think transnationally and act transnationally". 
 
Segmented cultural space means, first, that there could be a significant dichotomy between 
cultural expressions and identity in the public realm on the one hand and in the private 
sphere on the other. So far, most of the discussion of cultural practices and collective identity 
has focused on the highly contested public realm, revolving around Islamic fundamentalism, 
cultural (non-)recognition and multicultural policies. This is especially true for the proponents 
of the disintegration thesis. However, it would be premature to conclude from highly 
contested and symbolic political debates and answers of respondents to such items (e.g, 
Islamic conceptions of law and order vs. laicism and democracy) that disintegration of 
Turkish migrants in Germany is deepening. By contrast, we know very little about adaptation 
(uyum in Turkish and Anpassung in German) to cultural practices and everyday life in the 
private or small-group realm. For example, we would need to know more about important 
daily matters such as involvement of migrant school children in preparations for Christmas, 
or youth in soccer clubs (see Yalç⎬n-Heckmann 1994 for further non-representative 
examples).  
 
Second, cultural segmentation characterizes the world of Turkish migrants along ethnic and 
religious differences. For example, not only Sunni but also Alevi groups have begun to act 
collectively. The internal and cross-cutting ethnic and religious differentiations among Turkish 
immigrants in Germany are varied and complicated. If we take the three most numerous both 
self- and other-defined ethnic groups among Turkish citizens and their descendants as a 
point of departure -- Turks, Kurds and Arabs -- we can differentiate the following groups in a 
rough and preliminary way: Among Turks and Arabs we find mostly Sunnites, Alevites and 
atheists; among Kurds we find all these groups and very small Shiite groups such as the 
Yezidis (for a more nuanced view, see Spuler-Stegmann 1996). A recent study identified 47 
distinct ethnic groups in Turkey (Andrews 1989). Current processes of "positive" feedback 
cumulative causation suggest that groups other than Sunnis and Alevis are waiting in the 
wings to join the multicultural party. A move from very repressive to somewhat attenuated 
policies towards non-Turkish cultural practices the rate of mobilization among ethnic and 
religious groups has surged. With the Turkish government's relaxation of bans on 
associations and non-Turkish languages, culture and identity politics among ethnic groups in 
Turkey have "revived", for example among Alevis, Circassians and Laz. As has been the 
case among Kurds and Sunni Islamists discussed above, we could expect this new 
mobilization to be translated from Turkey to Germany. 
 
This mobilization has been underway among Alevis in Turkey and Germany, involving an 
ethnicization and politicization of religion in both contexts, mutually reinforcing each other. In 
Turkey, a state obligated to a laicist model, the rulers have shown tendencies to elevate the 
Sunni version of Islam to a quasi-official religion since the early 1990s. In turn, the PKK also 
jumped the train of incorporating Islamist rhetoric into their program and official 
proclamations. This has had severe consequences for some PKK adherents and supporters. 
For example, Alevis have been a very secular group. During the 1970s and 1980s they 
formed a good-sized support group for militant left operations; and a sizeable portion of PKK 
fighters were recruited from this milieu. However, estranged by Islamist declarations by the 
PKK’s leader, some Alevis have turned to ethnic symbols, thereby claiming their own 
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collective identity. One way of doing this has been by the adoption of Zaza, a language 
spoken around Dersim, a majority Alevi city in southeastern Anatolia (Roy 1996: 101). In 
Germany, the conflicts between Sunnis and Alevis were imported. Since Sunni groups have 
vied for the second generation in Germany, Alevi groups have faced competition. Up until 
now, most active Alevis participated in the political realm, for example in the Social-
Democratic Party (SPD). Growing competition for the second generation has led to a 
politicization of religion. Trying to reach members of the second generation, more and more 
Alevi entrepreneurs organize religious groups and try to mobilize their clients around the 
cultural symbols of Alevidom. In turn, this has feedback effects on conflicts between Sunnis 
and Alevis in Turkey; financial, human and social resources flow from Germany to Turkey to 
support the building of an organizational infrastructure among Alevis. 
 
Without a close analysis of actual patterns of adaptation and, possibly, syncretism in both the 
public and private realms and the manifold variations and trench lines in the religious world, 
we risk dramatic and unsubstantiated conclusions such as the portrayal of a more or less 
coherent Turkish transnational community or diaspora that is developing into a "parallel 
society" in Germany; with cumulative causation ending in a vicious circle (for this apocalyptic 
vision, see Heitmeyer et al. 1997). Most often, one particular form or sub-segment of a 
transnational community or a lose conglomerate of transnational circuits are taken for the 
whole. All we can say at the moment, however, is that cultural spaces inhabited by migrants 
and their descendants are undergoing rapid transnationalization in the context of feedback 
loops. 
 
Syncretist identities in this case does not mean a diaspora consciousness, on the one hand 
(e.g., a collective identity carrying elements of both Turkish or Kurdish and German but with 
a strong dominance of the former element due to an imagined homeland or collective 
religious community), nor does it denote a successful stage in the transition from one 
collective identity to another, on the other (e.g., Italian --> Italian-American --> American). 
Rather, it is an outcome of transnational ties and often segmented cultural practices that do 
refer to a successful synthesis in some cases (e.g., hip-hop musicians among the cultural 
elite) but also to an un-integrated existence of both German and Turkish elements next to 
each other (e.g., among some young Islamists). The emergence of syncretist individual and 
collective identities raises important questions concerning the relationship of the three 
responses of newcomers to insertion discussed above (see Figure 1). For example, it could 
be that cultural assimilation and multiculturalism are not mutually excluding strategies. Both 
strategies could form the backbone of transnational cultural practices that propose a certain 
degree of assimilation but keep their distance to the countries of settlement by emphasizing 
cultural difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion: The Uneasy Existence of Transnational Social Spaces 
"between" and "in" Nation-States 
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Various forms of cumulative causation in international migration are not restricted to 
migration as a set of self-feeding processes, typically producing migration flows that may last 
several decades with a clearly defined beginning and end. This is only a hallmark of the first 
period. Currently, a second period is characterized by a growing transnationalization of 
migrants' activities, encompassing all spheres of life. In a macro-structural view, international 
migrants partake as social capitalists in a more general process of transnationalization, albeit 
they are not large "global players" (Portes 1996). However, this does not mean that migrants 
engaged in transnational exchanges already form transnational communities. Whether or not 
lasting forms of transnational social spaces have developed that reach beyond the second 
generation of immigrants is too early to say. However, these phenomena have turned out to 
be a worthy subject of study in their own right. 
 
The problems arising in this second period of transnationalization are much more far-
reaching than in the first one. One challenge has been often noted: Nation-states trying to 
control international migration and the activities of migrants are not simply faced with 
controlling borders or with granting specific legal status up to citizenship. The "civil rights 
revolution" for immigrants and the internalization of human rights norms in nation-state 
regulations have limited the sovereignty of democratic nation-states in admitting and 
expelling non-citizens. An example for the first phenomenon is that immigrants with 
permanent resident status have social and economic rights equal to citizens; an example for 
the second is the so-called principle of non-refoulement in asylum law that forbids returning 
refugees to the country of origin if their life is threatened.  
 
Yet the challenges to nation-state policies in receiving and sending contexts are much 
broader once transnational social spaces have unfolded. Although the relationship is still 
asymmetric in terms of power between sending and receiving countries, the interdependence 
is stronger due to migrants living in both contexts, either practically (e.g., migrants 
commuting; exchanging goods and information) or symbolically (e.g., cultural practices that 
span two or more countries). In this context questions emerge such as: What happens to 
kinship systems and their traditional living together in one place when economic 
reproduction, risk diversification and betterment encompass various countries? What 
happens to notions of nationalism and nation-state unity when citizens move abroad and 
seek to establish a new homeland, carved out of the old one? What happens to notions of 
cultural uniqueness when persons acquire cultural repertoires that are transnational? Can 
the ancestral or (imagined) future homeland also be a de-territorialized space, such as the 
Islamic umma?  
 
In particular, the existence of transnational social spaces calls into question the dominant 
focus on immigrant (dis-)integration and (non-)assimilation on the nation-state level in 
receiving countries. As the initial empirical evidence presented here suggests, integration on 
the nation-state level (e.g., national citizenship and participation in formal labor markets and 
social insurance) is a crucial element of the migrant experience. However, this dimension 
needs to be complemented by a stronger focus on trans- (and sub-) national levels of 
analysis in order to capture the dynamics of exclusive or complementary sending and 
receiving country orientations of transmigrants and transrefugees, or even the formation of 
social spaces in between, such as diasporas.  
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The emergence of transnational social spaces concerns strategies of governments and 
migrants dealing with discrimination and xenophobia as well as multicultural claims. Indeed, 
it seems as if the stronger the controlling efforts by the respective governments, the stronger 
the resistance of various transmigrant groups. For example, this applies to both politically 
active Kurds and politically-religiously active Muslims. One of the ironies is that some of 
these carriers of transnationalization are self-proclaimed guardians of rigorous nationalist 
and religious projects. Seen in this way various forms of social capital and their benefits 
function as bridges for "long-distance nationalism" (Anderson 1994: 326) and long-distance 
religion.28
 
Transnational political and religious groups in the Turkish-German space suggest that 
geographical propinquity is not a necessary requirement for communities. However, in the 
cases analyzed in this paper another sort of propinquity is of utmost importance: ethnic or 
national and religious solidarity among sections of Kurds and Muslims, respectively. It is thus 
apparent that not only actual social ties matter but also symbolic ties between sending and 
receiving countries. The bridging function of social capital cannot be thought without 
collective representations. 
 
Migrations and refugee movements and the settlements of migrants and refugees is still at 
too early a stage to really evaluate whether transnational ties and linkages have crystallized 
in transnational communities such as diasporas. In order to speak of a diaspora, a group 
should be dispersed to more than one country. Although this is the case with Turkish labor 
migrants who settle not only in Germany but also, among others, in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France and Switzerland, the role of Germany is too dominating to speak of 
more than predominantly bi-national linkages and ties. This is somewhat different regarding 
Kurds. They seem to have dispersed more evenly in European countries such as Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
 
It is important to note that transnational social spaces are not deterritorialized. Some 
globalization scholars have already pronounced the detached nature of cultural 
representations in global flows. They posit that flows "occur in and through the growing 
disjunctures among ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and 
ideoscapes" (Appadurai 1996: 37). The ethnoscapes relate to persons such as tourists, 
migrants, refugees, exilees, guestworkers and other geographically mobile categories who 
influence the politics in and between nations to a degree not known before. To see 
transmigrants and refugees embodying as homeless is a tempting proposition. These could 
be seen as the first to live out transnational realities in their most complete form. Even those 
people remaining in familiar and ancestral places could find the nature of their ties to the 
place changed, and the image of an essential connection between place and culture, place 
and economics, place and politics broken. Instead, this analysis suggests that ethnoscapes 
are not magic carpets but fulfill contingent bridging function between nation-states 
                                                 
28 Sending countries riven by ethnic conflicts, economic crises and political instability seem to be much 
less effective in curbing transnationalization. This has only been possible in authoritarian and 
dictatorially-led regimes that prevented territorial exit. The collapse of the former Eastern communist 
bloc attests to the low viability of closed borders in the contemporary world. In the receiving countries 
large-scale ethnicization, sometimes accompanied by xenophobia, is a major outcome of 
transnationalization of civil and social rights (Faist 1995c). 
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demarcated by doors at the territorial borders and inside the nation-states. Aspects of the 
lives of transmigrants remain highly localized, albeit characterized by a profound bi- or 
sometimes even multifocality. This is so because the main resources involved -- social 
capital -- is a local asset that may nevertheless function as a transnational bridge. 
 
Although transnational social spaces are by and large neither intermittent nor serendipitous 
developments, two caveats relating to their continued feasibility are in order.29 Politicians, 
administrators and members of civil society in fairly liberal nation-states such as Germany 
may end the toleration or even casualness they currently show towards ethnically-based 
political, religious and cultural formations that maintain strong transnational linkages. The 
conditions for the existence of transnational spaces are mercurial. Under certain macro-
structural conditions, such as war, nationalism in the receiving country may create conditions 
under which groups with transnational linkages may be accused of disloyalty and are tested 
about whether they are patriots or traitors. Take the case of German Americans or US-
Americans of German descent for a moment. For most of the latter part of the 19th century 
and until World War One many of the economic, political and cutural ties this article 
described for Turks characterized German-Americans in the United States of America. A 
significant part of the German flow was triggered by the revolution of 1848-49 and -- going 
beyond contemporary examples -- there was much cross-fertilization between the radicals of 
that era and the reform wing of the Republican Party in the USA, as the distinguished career 
of Carl Schurz indicates. Economic ties can be found in the development of the American 
economy by firms such as Anheiser Busch, Steinway pianos, and all of the American optical 
industry. Moreover, German-language schools and a rich Vereinsleben signalled lively 
symbolic ties. Yet as a result of war between the USA and Germany in 1917, almost all of 
these linkages were sundered, and in fact most German Americans gave up their native 
language as well as their Gesangvereine and other distinctive cultural forms. For example, in 
26 U.S. states German was forbidden as a language of instruction in high schools and 
church congregations switched from German to English. Germanness lived on only in certain 
sects of the Lutheran Church, and even there in a hidden form. Not only did transnationalism 
disappear, but for all intents and purposes so did America's largest white ethnic group.30 In 
other words, the triadic reduced to a dyadic relationship between the two governments very 
rapidly. 
 
Transnationalization may also be attenuated when seen in the longer historical perspective 
for reasons other than the domestic repercussions of international conditions. What seems 
like a comparative advantage at one point -- for example Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany 
having access to cheap labor in their garment factories in Turkey, Kurdish exilees having a 
secure political basis to struggle for more autonomy or even independence in the 
southeastern provinces of Turkey, or Turkish muslims of various religious groups using 
Germany as a base to fight against secularism and laicism in Turkey -- may be a springboard 
to something entirely else for some, while it becomes a kind of trap for others preventing 
them from making more successful moves within the nation-state that has become their new 
home. It is only when these immigrants and their descendants also find a basis for their 
economic, political and cultural activities other than sending country or homeland affairs that 
                                                 
29 I am indebted to John Mollenkopf for his comments on the limits of transnational social spaces. 
30 There are plenty of other instances, e.g., Japanese in the United States and Canada. Their internment 
in camps during World War Two signalled the end of the Japanese-American transnational space. 
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elements of transnationalization can remain beneficial to them in the long run. In short, we 
should not allow our infatuation with transnationalization to cause us lose sight of the ever-
present lures of cultural assimilation on the one hand, and the dangers of segregation in the 
receiving countries on the other. It is an open empirical question whether some forms of 
transnational spaces turn into assimilation or segregation at a future date. 
 
Nevertheless, transnational social spaces add doubt to the dictum that the effects of 
transnational relations in general and international migration in particular are only a matter of 
incorporating those who want to stay in the receiving country as a previously unincorporated 
economic, political and cultural force into the polity, national markets or the national culture. 
Also, they raise questions about the hypothesis that the main problem of return migrants and 
refugees is only re-incorporation in the original sending countries, albeit on another level. 
Rather, the reality of transnational spaces indicates the progressive diffusion of nation-state 
projects concerning the salience of nationhood for selected groups of residents, and the 
simultaneous development of a new supra-national consciousness. In short, diffusion is a 
complex and contradictory process that encompasses both resurgence of ethnic and national 
identities and emergence of novel supra-national identities. This could have tremendous 
consequences not only for economic activities but also for political mobilization and cultural 
identity. For example, challenger groups in polities may increasingly direct their demands to 
at least two different governments and supra-national institutions such as the EU, and 
diasporas keep a critical distance towards both sending and receiving nation-state cultures. 
These processes offer opportunities for political and cultural entrepreneurs to re-introduce or 
at least strengthen well-known religious and ethnic cleavage lines in politics that have 
characterized much of European political and cultural history, adding to the importance of 
non-class-identified groups and organizations. At the same time, immigrants’ ties across 
borders can ease ethnic and religious tensions that accompany the adaptation of newcomers 
in the countries of settlement. 
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